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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID ALLEN STRANGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
)

NO. 45589
Washington County Case No.
CR-2017-1418

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Strange failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, imposed
upon his guilty plea to aggravated assault?

Strange Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Strange pled guilty to aggravated assault and the district court imposed a unified sentence
of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.40-43.) Following the
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.

(R., pp.53-54.)

Strange filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.
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(R., pp.55-56, 65-68.) Strange filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.69-70.)
Strange asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion
for a reduction of sentence in light of his claim that other inmates “‘made [him] do some stuff to
flop [his] rider.’” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7 (quoting R., p.59).) There are two reasons why
Strange’s argument fails. First, Strange requested the sentence he received and is therefore
precluded by the invited error doctrine from challenging the sentence on appeal. Second, even if
this Court reviews the merits of Strange’s claims, he has failed to establish an abuse of discretion
in the denial of his Rule 35 request for leniency.
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a ruling or
action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was error. State v.
Castrejon, 163 Idaho 19, 21, 407 P.3d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 2017) (review denied Jan. 4, 2018)
(citations omitted). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during
trial. Id. The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an
important role in prompting a trial court to take a certain action from later challenging that action
on appeal. Id. at 22, 407 P.3d at 609 (citing State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117,
120 (1999)).
On appeal, Strange contends that the district court abused its discretion by declining to
place him on probation or “return[ ] him to a ‘rider’” pursuant to his Rule 35 request for
leniency. (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) To the extent that Strange is claiming that the district court
abused its discretion by declining to reinstate jurisdiction pursuant to his Rule 35 motion, his
claim fails because the district court lacked the authority to do so. State v. Flores, 162 Idaho
298, 301-02, 396 P.3d 1180, 1183-84 (2017) (Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is inapplicable to a request
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for jurisdiction to be reinstated because such a request “does not constitute a correction,
modification, or reduction of a criminal sentence.”). Furthermore, Strange requested that the
district court relinquish jurisdiction when he signed the “Relinquish Retained Jurisdiction
Programs” form stating, “I, David Strange, IDOC #122909, understand that by signing this
document I am acknowledging that I am choosing not to participate in recommended Retained
Jurisdiction programs.” (R., p.50.) On the form, Strange wrote that he decided he “will go for
parole or top out,” and stated, “[A] rider is not for me.” (R., p.50.) Although Strange now
asserts that other inmates “forced [him] to relinquish” (Appellant’s brief, p.5), the district court
reasonably concluded that “the report done by the Idaho Department of Corrections contradicts
this, showing that Defendant voluntarily relinquished retained jurisdiction by stating that ‘a rider
is not for me’” (R., p.67 (quoting R., p.50)). The court’s conclusion is supported by the fact that
Strange’s case manager met with him before he signed the relinquishment paperwork and
discussed “the costs and benefits of relinquishing,” yet during the meeting Strange made no
mention of having been threatened by other inmates, and instead “continued to state that he
understood and would rather go the route of relinquishing or even top his time if necessary
instead of continuing the ‘Rider.’” (R., p.48.) “Consequently, the Court ordered relinquishment
of retained jurisdiction. The order relinquishing jurisdiction was executed according to the
request of Defendant and the recommendation of the Idaho Department of Corrections.” (R.,
p.67.) Because Strange requested that the district court relinquish jurisdiction and execute his
sentence, he cannot claim on appeal that the district court abused its discretion when it did
exactly that, or when it subsequently declined to place him on probation or “return[ ] him to a
‘rider’” pursuant to his Rule 35 request for leniency. (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) Therefore,
Strange’s claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error.
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Even if this Court considers the merits of Strange’s claim, he has still failed to establish
an abuse of discretion. In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the
Idaho Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a
sentence.” The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is
merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, “[w]hen
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” Id. Absent the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule
35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.” Id. Accord State v.
Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008).
Strange did not appeal the judgment of conviction or the order relinquishing jurisdiction
in this case, and he provided no “new” information in support of his Rule 35 motion that showed
he was entitled to a reduction of sentence. In the documents he submitted in support of his Rule
35 motion, Strange essentially complained about the conditions of his confinement and stated
that he “need[ed] out” of prison, claiming that he is “innocent” of the instant offense, that he is
“mentally disabled & need[s] outside help,” that “IDOC will not give [him his] proper
medication,” that prison “gangs” had threatened his life, and that “the yard is a threat to [his]
safety & others it’s against [his] constutional [sic] rights to be in curl [sic] punishment.” (R.,
pp.58-64.) Strange’s claims about the conditions of his confinement do not render his sentence
excessive, and do not demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. Further, a motion
for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is not an appropriate vehicle for a constitutional attack
on the conditions of confinement. State v. Garza, 115 Idaho 32, 34, 764 P.2d 109, 111 (Ct. App.
1988) (affirming district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion) (citing State v. Roach,
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112 Idaho 173, 730 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1986)). Challenges to prison conditions are more
appropriately brought in a post-conviction proceeding or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 532, 20 P.3d 709, 716 (Ct. App. 2001).
Strange also claimed, in his Rule 35 motion, that he was “forced to voluntarily relinquish
his Rider by threats on his life by prisoners at IDOC.” (R., p.55.) This claim is questionable,
however, in light of Strange’s consistent rule violations throughout his period of retained
jurisdiction, and because he failed to report the alleged threat until after the Department of
Correction sent its letter recommending relinquishment. (R., pp.48-49, 58-64.)
Strange was sentenced on March 20, 2017, and “arrived at ISCI on 4/11/2017 for the
RDU process. He was sent to CAPP for his Rider on 5/16/2017” and, “due to medical/mental
health concerns,” he was “returned to ISCI on 7/11/2017.” (R., pp.36, 48, 51.) Strange indicated
that he was not threatened by other inmates (who purportedly “made [him] do things” that
“cause[d] [him] to flop” his rider) until after he was transferred back to ISCI on July 11, 2017;
however, his disciplinary issues began at the outset of his period of retained jurisdiction and
continued throughout its duration. (R., pp.48, 51, 59-62, 64.) During his initial five-week stay at
ISCI “for the RDU process” (from April to May 2017), Strange incurred disciplinary actions for
talking to inmates in segregation and disobeying a direct order. (R., pp.48, 51.) After Strange
was transferred to the CAPP facility, he continued to the violate the rules with conduct including
misusing state property, failing to make his bunk, and going to recreation when not authorized,
and program staff also reported that Strange was caught lying to and attempting to manipulate
both correctional officers and medical staff in order to obtain “pain killers.” (R., pp.48-49.)
Strange’s persistence in violating the rules after he was returned to ISCI in July 2017 appears to
be nothing more than a continuation of his pattern of noncompliant behavior, as several of his
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subsequent disciplinary actions were for similar conduct and included lying “about his housing
assignment in order to get into recreation,” loitering around the pharmacy, “spraying other
inmates with spray bottles,” possessing “multiple photos of female models at recreation,” and
theft (for eating a second tray of food in the dining hall). (R., pp.48-49.)
On August 15, 2017, Strange met with his case manager and “stated that he wanted to
relinquish his Retained Jurisdiction sentence.”

(R., p.48.)

Strange’s case manager had a

discussion with Strange regarding “the costs and benefits of relinquishing,” during which
Strange made no mention of any threats from other inmates, but merely “continued to state that
he understood and would rather go the route of relinquishing or even top his time if necessary
instead of continuing the ‘Rider.’” (R., p.48.) On his refusal to program paperwork, Strange
wrote that his “[r]eason for relinquishing” was “because I decided since the state thinks prison
will benefit me I will go for parole or top out and leave Idaho because I want out of the State of
Idaho to go with & be with my family ….” (R., p.50.) In a subsequent letter that he submitted in
support of his Rule 35 motion, Strange changed his story and claimed that his reason for
relinquishing was that “the gangs” at ISCI had threatened him with the “goal” of “caus[ing]
[him] to flop” his rider. (R., p.62.) Although this “goal” was ostensibly accomplished when
Strange signed his relinquishment paperwork, Strange nevertheless continued to violate the rules
thereafter, incurring disciplinary actions for “possession of an unauthorized radio” and
“disrespectful language to staff when unauthorized property, ear buds, were being confiscated.”
(R., pp.49-50, 62.) On August 22, 2017, Strange “[p]ulled another inmate down while striking
him on the top of the face using a closed fist and yelling ‘disrespect me mother fucker!’”;
consequently, he received a DOR and “15 days detention.” (R., p.49.)
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A mental health clinician subsequently met with Strange and, although Strange was in
segregation – where he feels he is “safe” – he again made no report of having been forced to sign
relinquishment paperwork, of having been threatened by other inmates, or that he had any
personal safety concerns whatsoever.

(R., pp.51-52, 64.)

He reported only that he was

experiencing “Auditory Hallucinations, Depression, difficulty sleeping[,] and trouble focusing on
tasks/assignments.” (R., p.51.) The mental health clinician noted that Strange had “received a
treatment plan to provide [mental health] services” while on his rider, but – consistent with his
“history of non-compliance with treatment” – Strange was noncompliant with his mental health
medication regimen during his period of retained jurisdiction, and he was also unable to attend
group therapy “due to disciplinary issues.” (R., p.51.)
Strange did not report his claim that he was threatened by other inmates until September
6, 2017, when he submitted offender concern forms to IDOC staff asserting that he “need[s] out”
of prison because “the yard is a threat to [his] safety.” (R., pp.58-59.) In the letters that he later
submitted in support of his Rule 35 motion (which were written after he had “flop[ped]” his
rider), Strange requested that he be released on probation or “ban[ned] from Idaho till [his]
sentence is up,” averred that he would “do anything to be released on probation,” and – much
like his declaration that “a rider is not for [him]” – proclaimed that prison is “not for [him].” (R.,
pp.60-61, 64.)
The district court denied Strange’s Rule 35 request for leniency, concluding that Strange
had “failed to meet his burden to show that the sentence or relinquishment of retained
jurisdiction is excessive, illegal, or unreasonable in its severity.” (R., p.67.) The district court
reasonably determined that the report done by the Idaho Department of Correction contradicts
Strange’s claim that he was “forced to relinquish the retained jurisdiction.” (R., p.67.) Indeed,
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Strange did not report his claim that he was threatened by other inmates at any point throughout
his period of retained jurisdiction, despite having had many opportunities to do so; he voluntarily
signed the relinquishment paperwork without disclosing any concerns about his safety to his case
manager, clearly stating that he would prefer to serve his sentence in prison; and, while he claims
that other inmates at ISCI “made” him incur disciplinary actions so that he would “flop” his
rider, the majority of Strange’s rule-breaking behavior during his rider cannot be attributed to
said inmates’ attempts to force him to “flop” his rider, as six of the reported disciplinary
actions/incidents occurred before Strange was allegedly threatened, and three occurred after he
had signed the relinquishment paperwork, with only five of the 14 total reported behavioral
issues occurring during the period of time that Strange was purportedly being coerced into
signing relinquishment paperwork. (R., pp.48-49, 51, 62, 64.)
Strange provided no “new” information in support of his Rule 35 motion that showed he
was entitled to a reduction of sentence. The district court’s decision to deny Strange’s Rule 35
request to be placed on probation was appropriate in light of Strange’s ongoing disregard for the
rules and the deceptive and manipulative behavior he displayed during his period of retained
jurisdiction, which demonstrates that he is not a viable candidate for community supervision.
Given any reasonable view of the facts, Strange has failed to establish that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order denying
Strange’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of June, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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